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In  this  article  we  use  the  high-quality  data  coming  from  the 
Luxembourg Income Study Project, in a panel framework, to test for 
the effects of electoral systems on both poverty and income inequality. 
We find that when de degree of proportionality of an electoral system 
increases,  inequality  and  poverty  decrease.  We  also  find  than  in 
presidential  regimes,  the  levels  of  poverty  and  inequality  are  higher 
than in parliamentary regimes. 
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The link between electoral systems, income inequality and poverty has been proposed by 
several  authors.  Austen-Smith  (2002),  considering  a  model  with  an  endogenous  tax 
structure determined through legislative bargaining, suggests that a proportional electoral 
system, usually characterized by more than two parties, tends to favor more redistributive 
taxes than a two-party majoritarian one. Thanks to this redistribution of wealth, it should 
be associated to less income inequality and lower levels of poverty.  
Similarly,  Roland  and  Verardi  (2003)  suggest  that  since  in  majoritarian  systems, 
politicians tend to favor locally (not redistributive) targeted expenditures, while under the 
proportional rule, they tend to favor broad redistributive programs, the former systems 
should be associated to higher levels of income inequality and poverty than the latter. A 
first attempt to test for the effects predicted on income inequality has  been made by 
Birchfield and Crepaz (1998), but their results have been strongly criticized by Atkinson 
(2000) for the lack of comparability between the data used, given the non-homogenous 
definitions considered. Verardi (2004) showed, using high quality data, how the predicted 
effects of Austen-Smith (2002) and Roland and Verardi (2003) are confirmed by the data 
but did not consider poverty.  
In this article we use the high-quality data coming from the  LIS
1 project, in a panel 
framework,  to  test  for  the  effects  of  electoral  systems  on  both  poverty  and  income 
inequality.  In  addition,  we  also  test  for  the  effects  of  another  electoral  feature,  the 
political regime.  
The political regime represents the way in which the head of the government is elected 
and how he remains in office. There are many different systems in the World but all of 
them can be considered as being part of either the presidential regimes family or the 
parliamentary  regimes  family.  Several  authors  have  shown  how  presidential  regimes, 
given  their  idiosyncrasies,  are  associated  to  lower  levels  of  taxation  (Persson  and 
Tabellini,  1999)  and  less  redistributive  spending  (Diermeier  and  Feddersen,1998; 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000) than parliamentary regimes. So, similarly to what 
explained  previously  for  the  electoral  rule,  we  expect  presidential  regimes  to  be 
associated to more income inequality and higher levels of poverty than parliamentary 
regimes. We will test for this in the empirical part. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the second section, we briefly review the 
literature linking electoral systems, inequality and poverty, in the third, we present the 
methodology  and  the  data  we  use  and  in  the  fourth,  we  present  our  major  findings. 
Finally, in the fifth, we conclude.  
                                                 
1 Luxembourg Income Study 2. Brief review of the literature 
Electoral specialists almost all agree that the principal determinant to translate votes into 
seats  in  parliamentarian  elections,  is  the  district  magnitude.
2  Under  a  single-member 
district system, voters vote for one representative, in each district, that has to be chosen 
by a majority rule.
3 Under a multi-member system, all the representatives must be chosen 
following a proportional allocation rule to respect the share of votes cast by everyone
4.  
Persson  and  Tabellini  (1999)  have  shown,  in  the  context  of  a  Downsian  model  of 
electoral competition, that in larger districts, electoral competition will be diffused since 
parties will seek support from broad coalitions of voters. On the opposite, in smaller 
districts, competition will be concentrated in geographically determined constituencies, 
and spending will be targeted locally. Thus, when the district magnitude is large, public 
expenditures will be broad and composed principally of transfers while when it is small, 
expenditures will be mainly composed of local public goods. A similar conclusion is 
reached by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2000). Extending the strategic delegation model of Chari 
et al. (1997), they show that in large electoral districts, legislators represent nationwide 
distributed  socio-economic  groups,  targeting  expenditures  towards  them.  In  small 
districts,  they  represent  locally  determined  groups  and  prefer  to  target  expenditures 
locally.  
In addition, in single-member districts, the objective is to win 50% of the votes in 50% of 
the  districts
5.  Under  full  proportional  representation,  a  coalition  of  parties  needs 
approximately 50% of the national vote to get to power. Therefore, politicians internalize 
the benefit for a larger share of the population in the second case. As shown by Lizzeri 
and  Persico  (2001),  this  will  end  in  more  redistributive  programs  in  proportional 
representations and more local public good expenditures in majoritarian systems.  
Given that local public goods are not redistributive by nature, Verardi (2003) and Roland 
and  Verardi  (2003)  have  suggested  that  proportional  systems  should  be  associated  to 
lower levels of inequality. Austen-Smith (2002), considering a model with an exogenous 
political structure reaches a similar conclusion. He shows that proportional systems are 
associated  to  more  redistributive  taxes  than  a  typical  two-party  majoritarian  system, 
implying  less  income  inequality.  All  these  theories  suggest  that  majoritarian  systems 
should  be  associated  to  higher  levels  of  income  inequality  than  proportional 
representations. Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) have tried to test such a relationship but 
unfortunately, as highlighted by Atkinson (2000), their data are of a too weak quality to 
                                                 
2 That is to say, the number of members to be elected in each electoral district. 
3 First Past the Post, Alternative Vote or the Two-Round System. 
4 It is evident that the degree of proportionality of a system depends on the district size since when 
districts are very large, even very small parties are represented in the legislature. 
5 Or even less in the case of pure plurality. accept their results without a further analysis
6. For this reason, in this study, we try to test 
for this relationship but using high-quality data.  
As far as the regime type is concerned, it is commonly accepted that the crucial aspects 
that  differentiate  the  two  main  regime  types  are  the  separation  of  powers  (between 
politicians and offices)  and the maintenance of powers. Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
have shown, with a simple public finance model, that the separation of powers, and in 
particular the checks and balance constraint, has an effect on the size of the government 
since each organ of the state checks if the other is not extracting an excessive rent. This 
lowers the abuse of power and tends to lead to lower rents and lower tax levels. The 
redistributive effect of taxation should then be limited and this might bring to high levels 
of inequality.  
Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) and later Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) have 
shown that, in parliamentary regimes, a government has to rely on a stable coalition to 
keep its power while, in presidential regimes, it can stay in office till the end of his 
mandate.  This  means  that  in  parliamentary  regimes,  governments  have  to  please  a 
broader coalition of voters to stay in office. To do so, they orient spending towards the 
(non-geographically determined) heterogenous preferences of the coalition in power. This 
means  that  public  spending  will  be  associated  to  high  levels  of  transfer  expenditures 
rather than local public. In presidential regimes, the head of the government can remain 
in  office  till  the  end  of  his  mandate  and  thus  does  not  need  to  make  this  type  of 
expenditures.    Adopting  the  same  reasoning  as  for  the  electoral  rule,  we  can  expect 
parliamentary regimes (that are associated to more redistributive spending) to have more 
policies that counter-act inequality than presidential regimes. 
 
3. The methodology and the data 
The scope of this paper is to determine if electoral systems affect the level of income 
inequality  and  of  poverty.  To  test  for  this,  we  have  to  run  a  regression  where  the 
dependent variable is an inequality (or poverty) measurement and the independents are an 
indicator of the district  magnitude, and indicator of the political regime and  a set of 
control variables
7. 
                                                 
6 They do not consider the estimations made to make the indices comparable between countries and 
they consider heterogeneous definitions of inequality. 
7 In this paper, we use as indicator of the district magnitude, the natural logarithm of the mean district 
magnitude of the country. We have to work with an average magnitude since in a country (even if 
proportional), there might be several districts. We take the logarithm so that the regression equation 
will be of the semi-logarithmic type and will allow us to see the percentage change in the mean district 
magnitude instead of a unit change. This is very important since we think that a change of a district 
magnitude by one unit is very different if we consider a single member district or, for example, a 20-
member district. The  data  on  inequality  and  poverty  are  available  from  LIS  for  28  countries  and  an 
average of almost 4 years for each country. The data have thus a panel data structure. 
Since the electoral variable we are interested in hardly changes over time, a fixed-effect 
regression is not suitable here. A random effect estimator would be of no use either, since 
we work with countries and it is difficult to believe in a strict independence between 
exogenous  variables  and  the  permanent  component  of  the  error  term.  A  between 
estimator would be of no help since some dummy variables change over time, and the 
time of observation differs a lot between countries
8. We have thus to work with a pooled 
clustered regression.  
The cluster option is considered to control for the fact that observations are independent 
across countries but not within countries. Given that the panel is unbalanced, and we have 
no way of testing if the unobserved data are randomly missing, it might be argued that we 
give more importance to some countries than others. As a robustness test, we decided to 
compare our results with a weighted regression where all the observations are given the 
same importance. Finally, given that the number of observations is relatively limited, it 
might be possible that some results are created by outliers.  
For this reason, we run a final regression removing the outliers. Since the elimination is 
the  most  drastic  method  to  remove  their  influence,  if  the  result  of  the  outlier  free 
regression is similar to the ordinary one, we can affirm without any doubts that the results 
have not been generated by exceptional information.  
To detect the outliers, we prefer not to use standard regression diagnostic tools (such as 
standardized residuals, studentized residuals or Cook distances) since these methods have 
been shown to fail in the presence of multiple outliers because of the swamping and 
masking  effect  (Adnan  et  al.  2001)
9.  We  prefer  to  run  a  least  median  of  squares 
regression as suggested by Rouseeuw (1984) and calculate standardized residuals on this 
regression. In such a way we have a detection method that is based on a regression line 
that has not been attracted by outliers. The least median of squares methodology is a 
highly robust method that remains unaffected by up to 50% of outliers. It is not very 
efficient due to its slow convergence but since we are not interested in inference here this 
is not a problem.  
As far as the data are concerned, we only work with democratic countries (and periods) 
since electoral systems have a meaning only for these
10.  
The  dependent  variable  used  are  Gini  indices
11,  the  percentile  ratios: 
percentile90/percentile10
12 and the percentage of people who earn less than 40% of the 
                                                 
8 In particular, dummy variables identifying slight modifications in the definition of the indicator. 
9 Swamping occurs when observations are falsely identified as outliers. While masking occurs when true 
outliers are not identified. 
10 More than 0 in the polity variable, scaled from −10 to 10, available in the Jaggers and Marshall (2000) 
data set. 
11 N.B.  [ ] 0;100 ∈ Gini  
12 That means how many times the richest 10% earns more than the poorest 10%. median income; coming from the LIS data set. These are the only available inequality 
and poverty measurements that have an homogenous definition in all the countries.
13 All 
the measures are calculated on the differences on net
14 disposable income of individuals 
of all ages coming from an equivalence adjustment of households income through an 
equalitarian repartition within households.  
Even if some small differences exist between and within countries, we think that for the 
purposes of this study, these differences remain extremely small and do not affect the 
generality of the results. For example, even if there is a change in France, Germany and 
the Netherlands on the survey on which inequalities are calculated, the definitions remain 
unchanged. Since we do not consider changes over time but only between systems, this 
should not affect the results.  
Finally some calculation do not include self-employment income,
15 others include net 
income variables only
16 and finally some data on taxes are incomplete.
17 To correct for 
these effects, we create three dummies identifying each case and insert them on the right 
hand side of the regression.
18  
The variable identifying the district magnitude is the natural logarithm of the average 
number of elected representatives by district 
19. The variable identifying the regime type, 
is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  one  if  the  system  is  presidential  and  zero  if  it  is 
parliamentary. Before explaining our classification procedure, it is important to define 
precisely what we mean by presidential and what mean by parliamentary regimes. As 
defined by Persson and Tabellini (1999), presidential regimes are characterized by two 
important features. Firstly, the decision power is split among different politicians, who 
are  separately  and  directly  accountable  to  the  voters.  Secondly,  the  maintenance  of 
powers does not depend on a majority support in the assembly. Parliamentary regimes, on 
the contrary, rely on two completely different features. Firstly, proposal powers over 
legislation rest with the government and secondly, the survival of government depends on 
the support of a majority in the assembly.  
Consistent with this definition, in order to define a country as being presidential, we 
follow the coding scheme adopted by Beck et al. (2001). The first step of the procedure is 
the identification of how the chief of the executive is elected. If the head of the executive 
is popularly elected, the country will temporarily be defined as presidential but might be 
recoded as parliamentary if it does not fulfill the other requirements belonging to the 
definition. It could be that even if a country has a popularly elected president, in fact it is 
a parliamentary regime (or vice-versa). A second check, therefore, is to see, when there is 
a president, if he has to share its power with an elected representative of the parliament in 
                                                 
13 What is not the case in the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset. 
14 Of transfers and direct taxes. 
15 Austria in 1995. 
16 Belgium in 1985, 1988 and 1996; Italy in 1986, 1991 and 1995; Luxembourg in 1985, 1991 and 1994; 
Spain in 1980 and 1990; and Hungary in 1991 and 1994. 
17 France in 1984, 1989 and 1994 and Poland in 1986, 1992 and 1995. 
18 Note that by removing the data for which data on taxes are incomplete, our results are even stronger. 
19 We take the logarithm so that the results can be red in percentage. which case this could mean that there is no real separation of powers. If this is the case, it 
is important to identify the legislative power of the president. If the president can veto 
legislation  that  the  parliament  can  override  only  with  a  super-majority  or  if  he  can 
appoint or dismiss cabinet ministers or dissolve the assemblies whenever he wants, the 
system is characterized as presidential, otherwise it is coded as parliamentary. It is for 
this  reason  that  countries  like  France  or  Portugal,  despite  having  a  popularly  elected 
president, are coded as parliamentary. 
The control variables are those usually considered in inequality regressions. The first one 
(GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared) is considered because Kuznets (1955) and 
Lewis (1954) suggest that there should be a quadratic (inverted U) relationship between 
development and inequality
 20. The second control (percentage of people older than 65 
year in the entire population) is considered because Deaton (1997) argues that inequality 
should increase together with the age structure of the population, the reason being that 
young  people  have  more  similar  incomes  than  elderly  people  (Deaton  and  Paxson, 
1994)
21.  The  third  control  variable  (secondary  school  or  higher  attainment  by  people 
older  than  25  years)  is  motivated  by  Tinbergen  (1975),  Lodono  (1990)  and  Li  et  al. 
(1998),  who  suggest  that  a  higher  educational  attainment  is  expected  to  decrease 
inequality
22.  
Finally, the degree of openness of the countries (measured as the export more the imports 
in percentage of GDP) is aimed to control for the link proposed between trade openness 
and inequality (as described in World Bank, 2000)
23. Given the relative homogeneity of 
our countries, we do not expect all these variables to be highly significant here as it 
would be if data were available for all the countries in the world. We also control for 
regional  fixed  effect,
24  ethnic  and  linguistic  fractionalisation,
25  and  countries  with  a 
British legal system to remove an eventual Anglo-Saxon effect. Finally, we control also 
for time dummies identifying data available for each year to remove an eventual non-
linear trend in inequality
26. 
4. Results 
As we can see in Table 1 , there seems to be a significant relationship between income 
inequality and electoral systems
 27. We see that an increase by 100% of the mean district 
                                                 
20 Coming from the IMF Macro Time Series data. 
21 Coming from the UN population yearbooks. 
22 Coming from Barro and Lee (1996) education data. Missing data have been extrapolated from a time 
trend.  Data  for  Czech  and  Slovak  republic  have  been  considered  as  being  equal  to  data  relative  to 
Czechoslovakia. Data for Luxembourg have been proxied with Belgian data. 
23 Coming from the IMF Macro Time Series data. 
24 Through dummies identifying countries in East-Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America, Middle-East and North Africa, North America and Western Europe. 
25 Available form Alesina et al. (2003). 
26 And to control for the fact that data are available for very different periods depending on the countries. 
27 Note that the time dummies, the regional dummies and the dummies identifying data not considering 
self-employed,  considering  only  net  income  or  considering  incomplete  taxes  are  present  in  all  the 
regressions. magnitude (mdm) lowers the Gini index by almost 4 points. Similarly, when the mdm 
increases by 100%, the share of income owned by the 10% richest with respect to the 
share  owned  by  the  10%  poorest  decreases  by  approximately  0.5  units.  Finally,  an 
increase of 100% of the mean district magnitude, reduces by 1.07 units, the percentage of 
people who earn less than 40% of the median income. When we look at the regime type, 
we  see  that  all  other  things  been  equal,  presidential  systems  have  higher  levels  of 
inequality. Indeed we see that in presidential systems the Gini index is in average 20 
points  higher  than  in  parliamentary  regimes  and  the  inter  decile  proportion 
(decile90/decile10) is almost three times higher. The levels of poverty are also much 
higher. The percentage of people living with less than 40% of the median income in 
presidential regimes is in average 11.65 points higher than in parliamentary regimes. For 
all these measures, the results of the weighted, unweighted and robust regressions are 
similar.  Table 1: Electoral Systems and Income Inequality 
  Gini Index  Percentile ratio (p90/p10)  Poverty measure 










  (7.03)  (7.32)  (6.00)  (5.39)  (5.57)  (4.28)  (5.07)  (5.07)  (5.60) 










  (3.50)  (3.75)  (3.83)  (3.83)  (4.18)  (3.50)  (4.12)  (4.12)  (4.54) 




  (0.69)  (0.59)  (1.14)  (1.03)  (0.94)  (1.26)  (2.43)  (2.43)  (3.05) 















  (3.04)  (2.96)  (3.33)  (3.65)  (3.58)  (3.07)  (2.86)  (2.86)  (3.96) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  -14.67  -17.15  -7.37  1.11  0.75  1.78  -10.84  -10.84  -7.50 
  (0.92)  (1.08)  (0.48)  (0.42)  (0.29)  (0.59)  (1.32)  (1.32)  (0.96) 
Linguistic Fractionalization  34.22  38.59  22.58  -0.04  0.59  -1.14  23.12  23.12  17.98 
  (1.18)  (1.32)  (0.83)  (0.01)  (0.13)  (0.22)  (1.55)  (1.55)  (1.34) 








**  -5.80  -5.98  -5.91  -1.90  -1.90  -5.33 
  (2.45)  (2.87)  (2.57)  (1.34)  (1.56)  (1.32)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.50) 




  (0.51)  (0.63)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.54)  (2.17)  (2.17)  (3.02) 
Method  OLS  Robust  WLS  OLS  Robust  WLS  OLS  Robust  WLS 
Number of Observations  90  89  90  90  89  90  88  88  88 
Adjusted R
2  0.91  0.91  0.92  0.95  0.95  0.96  0.90  0.90  0.91 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
5. Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to determine if electoral systems, inequality and poverty are 
linked in democratic countries. Using high-quality data coming from the LIS database 
and  some  simple  panel  methods,  we  have  found  that,  first,  when  the  degree  of 
proportionality  of  a  system  increases,  inequality  and  poverty  decrease.  Second, 
presidential regimes are associated to higher levels of income inequality and poverty. 
Three measures have been considered, the Gini index, the percentile ratio (p90/p10) and 
the percentage of people earning less than 40% of the median income. With all these 
measures, the results go in the same direction and resist to robustness checks. In future 
research, it might be interesting to study this feature more in detail by considering more 
complex specifications that could be directly linked to the theoretical models.  References 
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